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It is equivocal whether the transnationalism of refugees differs significantly from that of labor and family migrants. On the basis
of a strategic case study of Burundian refugees in The Netherlands we demonstrate that migration motives undeniably matter
for transnationalism. Transnationalism is not self-evident for Burundians, as they are driven by a motive of flight. Moreover,
transnationalism is not automatically oriented towards compatriots and manifests itself differently in The Netherlands than
in Belgium. Therefore, we conclude that the study of refugees is an essential complement to the prevailing research on the
transnationalism of settled labor and family migrant communities.
1. Introduction
Transnationalism has become an important field of research
within migration studies since the 1990s. However, soon
after the initial enthusiasm, skepticism followed: phenom-
ena gathered under the denominator of transnationalism
appeared to be anything but new, and the spread of these
phenomena seemed largely overestimated. According to
Portes [1, page 182] this overestimation was due to the fact
that researchers investigated transnationalism in contexts
renowned for it; in other words, the abundance of transna-
tionalism was a direct consequence of how the dependent
variable was selected. This bias emerged in at least three ways
in studies on transnationalism.
Firstly, research was mainly carried out on transnational-
ism among settled migrant groups, first in the United States,
and later also in other Western countries. Examples are
Mexican migrants in the United States, Kurdish migrants
in Sweden, and Indian migrants in the United Kingdom
[2, 3], [4, pages 130-131]. Members of settled migrant
groups can more or less automatically utilize networks of
family, acquaintances, and transnational institutions for the
arrangement of their voyage and stay in the country of
destination, for developing transnational activities, and for
arranging the eventual (temporary) return to the country
of origin. Hence, transnationalism is easily available for
members of settled migrant groups. However, this is not the
case for members of “new” migrant groups and for dispersed
migrant groups [5, page 880].
Secondly, much of the research on transnationalism
selected respondents among members of associations and
clubs in settlement countries with a clear predilection for
the country of origin [3]. According to Jansen [6, page 185],
this selective attention given by researchers to transnational
institutions could explain why he did not find intensive
transnationalism among Bosnian refugees, while other
researchers did. Jansen came into contact with his respon-
dents via personal networks, and not—as other researchers
did—via refugee associations or clubs with strong ties to the
country of origin.
Thirdly, most research on transnationalism addresses
labor and family migrants. The question whether transna-
tionalism takes on different shapes for these kinds of
migrants in comparison with refugees who emigrated for
political reasons has only sporadically drawn attention and
has not yet been answered unequivocally. On one hand,
some researchers state that refugees are less involved with
transnationalism than labor and family migrants because
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migrants who have fled large-scale violence attempt to avoid
involvement with the country of origin [5, page 879] or
will limit their transnational activities to political resistance
against the system from which they have fled [7, pages 150–
154]. On the other hand, others maintain that refugees do
not differ as remarkably from labor and family migrants
regarding their social, cultural, and economic transnational
activities as is generally assumed [8, 9], although Bloch
[9] also finds that refugees are politically more active
transnationally than other types of migrants. Hence, it is
disputed whether or not transnationalism of refugees differs
fundamentally from that of labor and family migrants.
Our aim is to examine the significance of migration
motive for the transnationalism of Burundian asylum seekers
who have not had much time to settle as a migrant commu-
nity in The Netherlands. Our central research question is as
follows: how do migration motive and country of settlement
affect the nature and extent of transnational activities and
orientations among Burundian refugees? We will explore
whether or not the three assumptions dominating the start of
the “transnational turn” in the 1980s—that transnationalism
is more or less self-evident; that this is connected with
the “natural” bond between fellow countrymen; and that
countries of settlement are interchangeable in relation to
transnationalism—also pertain to Burundians who have
settled in The Netherlands. We have chosen to study this par-
ticular migrant population because it differs in all respects
from those studies criticized by Portes for their bias in the
selection of the dependent variable. Namely, the migration
population we studied differs in the extent to which it is
settled, its members’ motives for migration, and the insti-
tutional embeddedness of its members. Burundians in The
Netherlands constitute a small community, consistingmainly
of asylum seekers who have arrived fairly recently. Hence, this
is not a study of a settled community of labor and family
migrants. Moreover, the study is not limited to members
of Burundian organizations and associations, but covers the
transnational contacts and orientations of Burundian asylum
seekers with various socioeconomic backgrounds. (Finally,
our analysis is limited to the transnationalism of Burundians
in the country of settlement of The Netherlands; we have not
done research on the transnationalism of Burundians outside
The Netherlands.)
2. Data Collection
Data has been collected by the third author [10]. She started
the selection of respondents with the snowball sampling
method. Initially, four key persons brought her into contact
with other Burundian migrants in their networks. This
strategy was supplemented with other methods in order
to prevent respondents being solely recruited from the
upper class of the Burundian migrant community. These
methods included Snick approaching Kirundi speaking
people, addressing the public and artists during a Burundian
drummers’ concert, establishing contact with Burundians
with various residence permits with the assistance of the
Dutch Refugee Council (Vluchtelingenwerk Nederland), and
looking up Burundian last names in the phonebook. (Snick
used the phonebook listed on the website of a Dutch national
telephone company (http://www.detelefoongids.nl/, similar
to any national White Pages phonebook) and typed typical
Burundian last names in the category “Who.”While selecting
among the hits the search provided the author for optimal
geographic dispersion of respondents across all regions in
The Netherlands).
In total, eighteen Burundian refugees residing through-
out The Netherlands were interviewed. The interviews were
semistructured, using a topic list with the main theme
being respondents’ contact with Burundian people in The
Netherlands, in Burundi, and elsewhere. Each interview
lasted approximately one hour. Respondents were mainly
interviewed in French, except in some cases where the
respondent mastered the Dutch language. The selection of
respondents consisted of twelve men and six women. Their
age varied between twenty and fifty years. Although the most
deprived migrant category—unskilled or illegal migrants—
is missing, the selection does contain low-skilled Burundians
with unfavorable socioeconomic positions (see Table 1).
Nine respondents had a temporary residence permit, eight
had a Dutch passport, and one respondent was still waiting to
hear about her asylum application from the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (IND). Six respondents had stopped
going to school while in Burundi, eight had finished primary
or secondary education, and six had finished some form of
higher education or university. Eleven respondents had not
been working at the time they left Burundi, four had been
employed in low paid jobs and three respondents had been
in well-paid jobs for the Burundian government. At the time
of data collection in The Netherlands, six respondents did
not have a paid job, seven had a temporary job, and five had
a permanent job.
3. Background of Emigration from Burundi
To place our analysis in context, we first outline both the
turbulent political history of Burundi and then the history
of migration from Burundi to The Netherlands.
The Republic of Burundi is located in the Great Lakes
region of eastern Africa. In comparison to other African
countries, Burundi has a rather homogeneous population
consisting of Hutus, Tutsis, and Twa. These three categories
share the Rundi culture and Kirundi as a common language.
For this reason some researchers consider the inhabitants of
Burundi a single ethnic group [11, 12].
Burundi was originally established as a kingdom in the
sixteenth century [13]. Subsequently, at the Berlin Confer-
ence of 1884-1885, at which Africa was divided between
the main European powers, the area of Burundi was part
of the territory allocated to Germany. After the First World
War, Burundi became part of the Belgian colonial empire.
The Belgians cultivated the myth of Tutsis as predestined to
rule over Hutus and dismantled the complex social structure
characterized by intricate interdependencies between both
categories. The fluidity once characteristic of the Hutu and
Tutsi status was replaced by a rigid conception of identity in
terms of ethnic primordialism [14] emphasizing the unequal
relationship between both categories [13].
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Table 1: Background characteristics respondents.
Pseudonym Age Marital status Residence status Education before emigration Education in The Netherlands
(1) Monique 36 Divorced Naturalized University (stopped) Higher professional education (stopped)
(2) Pierre 26 Single For 5 Years University (stopped) Higher professional education (in progress)
(3) Viviane 50 Married Naturalized
Higher professional education
(completed)
Dutch as a second language
(4) Marcel 22 Single For 5 Years Secondary school (completed) Higher professional education (in progress)
(5) Ve´ronique 20 Single W-document1 Secondary school (completed) Secondary vocational education (in progress)
(6) Lucien 47 Married Naturalized
Higher professional education
(completed)
Dutch as a second language
(7) Patrick 32 Married Naturalized University (stopped) University (completed)
(8) Emile 36 Single For 5 Years
University (finished in another
African country)
Higher professional education (in progress)
(9) Philipe 41 Divorced Naturalized
Higher professional education
(completed)
Dutch as a second language
(10) Leon 33 Married For 5 Years University (stopped) Higher professional education (in progress)
(11) Ste´phane 27 Single For 5 Years Secondary school (completed) Dutch as a second language
(12) Bernard 37 Divorced For 5 Years
Secondary vocational education
(completed)
Dutch as a second language
(13) Vale`re 27 Single For 5 Years
Secondary vocational education
(finished in another African country)
Secondary vocational education (in progress)
(14) Alice 23 Single For 5 Years Secondary education (in progress) Dutch as a second language
(15) Claudine 28 Married For 5 Years University (stopped) Higher professional education (in progress)
(16) Andre´ 25 Divorced For 5 Years Primary education (completed) Secondary vocational education (in progress)
(17) Maurice 48 Single Naturalized University (completed) Dutch as a second language
(18) Isabelle 36 Married For 5 Years
Higher professional education
(completed)
Dutch as a second language
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Document for asylum seekers whose application is still in progress.
Following Burundi’s independence in 1962, the political
situation was unstable. A first wave of large-scale violence
took place in 1965, after a Hutu prime minister was assas-
sinated. Militant Hutus established a liberation movement
in the neighboring countries. In 1972, they attacked major
cities in Burundi; the fighting and its aftermath resulted in
more than 200,000 casualties. In 1988, Hutus killed hundreds
of Tutsis during riots. In response, the army killed roughly
20,000 people, while tens of thousands Burundians fled
their homes. The assassination of the first Hutu head of
state by Tutsi soldiers during a coup after the first free
elections of 1993 resulted in further violence and bloodshed
between Hutu extremists and the Tutsi army [13, page 5].
Tens of thousands of people were killed within a matter
of days. In 1994, the newly elected president of Burundi
and the president of Rwanda died when the airplane they
were traveling in was shot down. This incident was the
immediate cause of the Rwandan genocide. The country was
ethnically divided; killings continued with many citizens as
both perpetrators and victims [15]. Out of a population
of eight million, one million Burundians were displaced
or forced to flee. Peace talks between stakeholders started
as a result of international pressure and in 2000, a peace
agreement was signed by the president and most armed
factions. With the help of a UN mission in Burundi the
treaty still endures; however, the political situation remains
unstable and the population continues to suffer from armed
attacks.
Civil war, oppressive politics, and genocide have peri-
odically forced large numbers of Burundi’s population to
leave the country and go into exile [15]. For example, at
the end of 2006, Burundi remained one of the main-source
countries of refugees—approximately 400,000 refugees were
recognized as such according to the Geneva Convention—
but, at the same time, Burundi has experienced major
flows of returnees [16]. Most refugees remained in exile in
neighboring countries, particularly Tanzania. In 2012, there
are still some 150,000 internally displaced persons living in
settlements in Burundi as well as some 90,000 refugees and
asylum seekers originating from Burundi [17].
Refugee flows to The Netherlands began in 1993. From
1993 to 2008, 3,344 Burundians applied for asylum in The
Netherlands. (The figures for 1993 to 2004 are based on the
Migration Policy Institute [18] data online; consulted in June
2009. Data for 2005 and 2006 are based on De Boom et
al. [19]; data for 2007 and 2008 are based on figures from
[20] online database Statline; consulted in June 2009.) Up
until 2006, all Burundian asylum seekers were given at least
a temporary residence permit on humanitarian grounds,
based on Dutch immigration policy for specific countries. In
other words, the Dutch government perceived the situation
in Burundi to be too dangerous to return asylum seekers to
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their country of origin. In 2006, this categorical protection
policy was dismantled and the temporary residence permits
were withdrawn. (Between 2005 and 2008, 1.570 residence
permits have been granted to Burundians, of which 640 for
an undetermined amount of time. ([20], consulted in June
2009).)
4. Transnationalism of Burundian Refugees
Hence, the small community of Burundian refugees that has
recently settled in The Netherlands deviates essentially from
the settled labor and family migrant communities known
for their active transnationalism. Does this imply transna-
tionalism is not self-evident for our respondents; do they
not automatically identify with compatriots, and do they
attach a different meaning to The Netherlands as a settlement
country than to Belgium as the former colonizer of Burundi?
5. Nature and Extent of Transnationalism
Before we answer the question of the nature and extent of
transnationalism among our selection of Burundian respon-
dents we first clarify how we use this concept in our analysis.
In general, transnationalism refers to the situation in which
migrants are simultaneously embedded in the societies of
more than one nation state [4, page 131]. Formulated
differently, transnationalism refers to a situation in which
migrants are embedded in “networks linking people in
sending and receiving nation states who by cross border con-
nections create new transnational spaces” [21, page 4]. These
“transnational social spaces” not only encompass the coun-
tries of origin and settlement, but also other locations in the
world where fellow countrymen live with whom migrants
keep in touch, the so-called diaspora. As already mentioned,
our analysis is limited to the microlevel of individual
migrants; hence we set aside both the mesolevel of transna-
tional institutions and the macro level of the policies of send-
ing and receiving countries. We understand the transnational
embeddedness of individual migrants in societies of two or
more countries both in terms of “ways of being” —that is,
the actual social relations and practices that are part of the life
of migrants—and in terms of “ways of belonging” —that is,
practices expressing a feeling of belonging to or identification
with a specific group or location [22].
Our broad interpretation of this definition of transna-
tionalism at the level of individual migrants is evident in
three respects. Firstly, in our conceptualization, transnation-
alism consists not only of physical geographical mobility,
but also of the exchange of material sources, information,
and ideas across borders. Secondly, we do not limit the
definition of transnationalism to structural, permanent
forms of transnational practices and orientations; we include
incidental, temporary practices, and orientations as well.
Thirdly, we also account for the mutual interactions between
Burundians in The Netherlands when analyzing transna-
tionalism. In a strict sense, these contacts fall outside the
scope of our definition of transnationalism because they are
not border-crossing practices. However, we have included
these interactions in our analysis because they proved to be
of indirect importance for the transnational involvement of
our respondents. Mutual interaction between Burundians in
The Netherlands led to an exchange of information about
Burundi and those who stayed behind [8], [9, page 301]. As
Carling [23, page 1455] states, the analysis of transnational
practices and their impact should include not only people
actually engaged in transnational practices, but also those
who are part of the social constellation connected by
transnational relationships. Furthermore, the way in which
respondents interacted with their fellow countrymen in The
Netherlands more or less reflected their interactions with fel-
low countrymen in the diaspora and in the country of origin.
In short, we label some practices and orientations as transna-
tional that would otherwise fall outside the scope of a nar-
rower definition of transnationalism. We have consciously
opted for a broad definition so that we could grasp differ-
ences in transnationalism between respondents that would
otherwise have remained invisible if we had chosen to main-
tain a narrow definition. Moreover, these differences were
significant for the respondents themselves.
According to our definition of transnationalism, most
Burundians included in our study were somehow transna-
tionally active. Fourteen of the eighteen respondents main-
tained relationships with fellow countrymen in Burundi and
fifteen respondents maintained contact with Burundians in
the diaspora. The latter predominantly concerned relation-
ships with compatriots in Belgium or people they had met
in the United Nations’ refugee camps where respondents had
lived before they were invited to come to The Netherlands
under refugee status. Most interactions did not take place
physically, but by (mobile) phone, internet forums, mail, fax,
or money remittances. Additionally, our respondents visited
fellow countrymen in Belgium and Burundi.
Most of the contacts were socially oriented and involved
family and friends. Furthermore, respondents also men-
tioned religious contacts with people of the same faith;
cultural contacts, particularly associated with the most well-
known cultural exponent of Burundi, the Tambourinaires
de Burundi; sporting interactions, in particular table tennis
and soccer competitions between Burundian teams from
TheNetherlands and Belgium; economic relationshipsmain-
tained predominantly through aid development projects;
political contacts. Moreover, all respondents kept in touch
with fellow countrymen in The Netherlands. These contacts
consisted of informal conversations, friendly visits, praying
together and joint visits to political or cultural activities.
Contacts with Burundians in The Netherlands usually did
not consist of people the respondents had known in Burundi,
but people they had met in The Netherlands, often in centers
housing asylum seekers.
Though the majority of the respondents were transna-
tionally active in some way or another, this was not the case
for all respondents. For example, six respondents did not
maintain contact with family in Burundi because they did
not know where their family members resided or because
they no longer had any family living in Burundi. Moreover,
communication was often inconsistent, limited to irregular
contacts by phone or to visits to Burundian internet forums
hosted from Belgium, France, Canada, or The Netherlands.
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Transnationalism was difficult for different reasons. First,
it was often technically impossible to keep in touch with
family outside Burundi’s capital because (mobile) phones
and internet were not widely dispersed. As a result of few
or slow internet connections, most transnational contacts
via internet took place between compatriots within the
diaspora. Ste´phane (male, age 27, temporary residence
permit) explained how difficult it was to phone his mother.
When he wanted to talk to his mother, he would phone her
neighbors. They subsequently made an appointment for a
number of days later and made sure that his mother would
be with the neighbors at the appointed day and time. If his
mother wanted to talk to him, she would warn a friend of
Ste´phane, whowould subsequently call Ste´phane, who would
then phone the neighbors at the agreed moment when his
mother would be present.
Residence permits could pose another problem for
transnational practices. Asylum seekers whose request for
asylum was still being processed or who had received a
temporary residence permit were not allowed to travel to
Burundi; doing so meant losing the rights attached to their
current asylum status. Other respondents avoided contact
with fellow countrymen because they considered such con-
tact a hindrance to their goal of passing the civic integration
examination in The Netherlands. They were afraid these
contacts would take place at the expense of their orientation
towards The Netherlands and the Dutch people: “In that
case, your language does not progress.” All respondents took
the civic integration exam seriously because passing it was a
precondition for obtaining a Dutch passport. Furthermore, a
number of respondents pointed out that they were too busy
to maintain contacts with fellow countrymen:
“I want to achieve level two [of the Dutch lan-
guage examination]. I domy homework every day.
Often I have no time to make a phone call. When
I am called by Burundians I know, I want them
to get to the point. Talking on the phone for five
minutes is long enough” (Isabelle, female, age 36,
temporary residence permit).
Transnational interactions was also difficult for respon-
dents lacking economic and social capital. Not all respon-
dents could afford to phone, travel or send money to those
who stayed behind. For example, Monique (woman, 36 years
old, naturalized) lived in difficult financial conditions ever
since her father was killed in 1972. She heard from others
who had visited Burundi that her mother lived in poverty.
She sent money to her mother that she did not have herself:
“Being financially in the hole helps a little bit.” Others were
impeded by the insecurity associated with their temporary
residence permit or they lacked the indispensable social
contacts to start a project in Burundi. Ste´phane (male, age
27, temporary residence permit) discontinued the vocational
education he needed to start a computer project in Burundi.
He said “Perhaps it is because of the uncertainty of whether
or not they will allow me to stay long enough to finish my
education and get a degree.” He remarked on his limited
social capital:
“There are a lot of Burundian executives in The
Netherlands, Belgium, France and Canada: all
sorts of people, ranging from ministers to profes-
sors. It seems as though only the president does not
live abroad. But I do not know anybody, I have no
way in. I am unfamiliar with donor organizations
and I do not know how to write a project proposal.”
However, transnationalism was not only absent for
practical reasons. Some respondents deliberately renounced
transnational activities. They were afraid this would cause
them trouble again. For example, Marcel (male, age 22,
temporary residence permit) went to live with his uncle and
aunt in Bujumbura after his parents had died in the war. After
his uncle disappeared without a trace, he fled the country
with the help of a family friend. He talked about contact with
fellow Burundians in The Netherlands as follows: “It is not
good to have contact. Sometimes it scares me because when I
call my aunt in Bujumbura she always tells me to ‘watch out
and be careful’.” Bernard (male, age 37, temporary residence
permit) managed to escape from prison—where he had been
locked up for a year—during an attack by a group of rebels.
He had only superficial contact with fellow countrymen
in The Netherlands. He said “I am not in Burundi. I’m
in Europe. The community, the drummers, that does not
interest me. It’s better to avoid them; otherwise you can get
into trouble.”
6. Two Categories: Transnationalism as
Possibility and Choice
Among the respondents, two categories could be distin-
guished that clearly differed with regard to the extent to
which they were able and willing to maintain transnational
contacts.
The first category consisted of Burundians who had
previously stayed in Europe for study or work by the time
the situation in Burundi escalated during the 1990s, or those
who were quickly recognized as refugees because they could
prove they were persecuted by Burundi rulers because of
their publicly visible political activism. These Burundians
had the means and the connections to flee the country
quickly. They left before the ethnic conflict escalated and
did not experience the war personally. Therefore they were
uninhibited in their contact with the country of origin.
Moreover, most of these respondents possessed a Dutch
passport that allowed them to travel to and from Burundi
and they could afford to pay for these travels as well. Not only
did they maintain social contacts with people in Burundi,
they were also involved in sociocultural and political insti-
tutions and organizations in The Netherlands, and with the
help of development aid they participated in development
activities in Burundi [24, 25]. A good example of respondents
in this category is Maurice (male, age 48, naturalized). He
is highly qualified and manages a successful micro credit
project for farmers in the Burundian countryside. He works
part-time as an accountant and part-time on his project.
He owns a house in the capital and travels there once or
twice a month. He plans to work full-time on his project
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from The Netherlands. All project plans he has submitted
thus far have been subsidized by Belgian and Dutch donors.
Moreover, Maurice is a member of a Burundian cooperation
located in Europe that was established in Belgium, and
he created a platform intended to improve collaboration
between Burundian organizations active in The Netherlands.
The other five respondents involved in development projects
in Burundi also had the right contacts to get a project started
in bureaucratic Burundi and they knew the right channels in
The Netherlands to obtain funding for their projects.
The second category consisted of respondents who had
fled after the ethnic conflict had escalated in 1993 and had
experienced these conflicts personally. Some of them had
sheltered in protected refugee camps of the United Nations
in surrounding countries and had been invited by the Dutch
authorities to apply for asylum. These people maintained
little contact with Burundi because they had hardly any
family left there, or because their past was so emotionally
charged that they neither could nor wanted to go back.
Transnational contacts with fellow Burundians were often
limited to the people with whom they had spent time in a
refugee camp. Others had fled the country on their own and
had requested asylum upon arrival. These weremainly young
men with a temporary residence permit, who had not been
able to flee the conflicts in time and who had experienced the
war personally. If they would return to Burundi, they would
lose their right to asylum. These men developed a weak
transnationalism: now and then they called the country of
origin or remitted money home. They maintained relations
with Burundians they had met in the asylum seeker center
they had stayed in. Not only was the category of Burundians
that had fled the country as a direct consequence of the
fighting reticent towards contacts with other Burundians
here and elsewhere, they also had less social and cultural
capital to maintain contacts with Burundi and they usually
had no Dutch passport allowing them to travel to Burundi.
In short: the Burundians that had been the in The
Netherlands longest, maintained the most intensive transna-
tional contacts because they wanted to and had the means
to do so. The respondents who had fled after the ethnic
conflicts had escalated were less inclined to maintain such
contacts due to their fear to get drawn into the conflict
again and lacked the necessary economic and social capital
and the residence permit to do so. In other words, the
Burundians who had arrived before the conflicts erupted
in 1993 were transnationally more active than those who
arrived thereafter. For similar reasons, Al-Ali et al. [26,
pages 587, 597] found more transnationalism amongst
Eritrean migrants who had fled during the independence
war—between 1961 and 1991—than amongst Eritreans who
had fled after the conflicts with Ethiopia had flared up
at the beginning of the twentieth century. (Hence, the
rapid intergenerational decline of transnationalism does not
automatically imply a linear evolution [21].) Comparable
differences of the extent to what asylum seekers have the
capability and the willingness to be transnational are found
among Eritrean, Albanian Yugoslavians, and Bosnians [8,
27]. For instance, Bosnian Muslims who were granted
political asylum in The Netherlands or the United Kingdom
experienced much more opposition in their attempts to
maintain social contacts with compatriots that remained
in the territory under Serbian government than those with
relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina where Bosnian Muslims
were in power. And Eritrean asylum seekers who disapproved
of the Eritrean government were more reluctant to pay a
voluntary tax for the reconstruction and independence to the
Eritrean government than supporters of the government [8,
page 630].
This leads to the conclusion that the capability of
transnationalism cannot be assumed readily available for
refugees, because they often lack the necessary economic
and social capital, and permanent residence permit [28],
[26, page 588], [29, page 785], [7, page 149], [5, page 887].
Neither can their readiness for transnationalism be assumed
present as a result of their fear to get drawn into conflicts
again they have fled from before [30, pages 870, 872]. This
means transnationalism of refugees is not self-evident and
endorses the importance of migration motive in relation to
transnationalism.
7. Migrant Communities Are
Not Homogeneous: Consequences
for Transnationalism
Not only is transnationalism occasionally assumed to be
self-evident, but migrants originating from one country are
often represented as a homogeneous group in the country of
settlement as well [31], [26, page 594], and [4, page 144].
According to Lucassen [21], the public and the politicians
of receiving countries often suppose an automatic solidarity
between immigrants originating from the same country.
Consequently, no distinction is made in their involvement
with their country of origin. Authorities of sending countries
like Mexico, Morocco, and Turkey contribute to this image
of homogeneous migrant populations because they boost
the “natural” link between emigrants and their country of
origin in their emigration policy and attempt to stimulate
the continuation of this link through all sorts of measures
[32]. Surveys also often assume a rather uniform image of
migrant populations [28, page 30]. Migrants are classified
according to their nationality or country of origin and
general conclusions are drawn, such as: “Moroccans are less
involved in transnational activities” [33, page 294]; see also
[5, 29].
“Being Burundian” was indeed an important identity
marker for the respondents in the present study. Despite
the ethnic division in the country of origin, they called
themselves Burundian rather than Hutu or Tutsi. Moreover,
most respondents said that Hutus and Tutsis live together
peacefully in The Netherlands and that almost all activities
were organized for both groups. Additionally, most respon-
dents said they wanted to reconcile with each other and that
the ethnic divisions in their country of origin were politically
constructed and had not always existed. Philip (male, 41
years old, naturalized) remarked “Burundians are brothers.
The Burundian conflict has been used as an instrument to
hold on to power. But in Burundi, in the church, at the
market, on the soccer field, on the “collines”, Burundians
International Journal of Population Research 7
walk hand in hand everywhere.” Turner [34, page 1165] also
states that the Burundian conflict can no longer be solely
understood in terms of ethnic contrasts: “In brief, Burundi
has experienced a shift from binary conflict between two
irreconcilable positions based on ethnicity—two positions
that could not even agree on what the conflict was about
(Lemarchand, 1996)—to a complex conflict between a
multiplicity of opinions and alliances where ethnicity no
longer is the main fault line.”
Yet ethnic contrasts slumbered beneath the surface. The
first sign of this was evident from the fact that most
respondents agreed to be interviewed under the condition
that they would not be questioned about political and ethnic
contrasts in their country of origin. Although this subject
was therefore not raised as a separate interview topic, it was
frequently brought up by respondents themselves. Marcel
(male, age 22, temporary residence permit) said: “You almost
forget the Hutu-Tutsi matter. You even do not want to talk
about it anymore. We try to be Burundian, but you are aware
of what has happened anyhow.” Many young Burundians
who were raised with the conflicts in Burundi had adopted
the ethnic rhetoric of the political parties, including the
resentments towards members of the other ethnic group.
Irreconcilable viewpoints regarding the Burundian question
were predominantly brought up by these respondents. Andre´
(male, age 25, temporary residence permit) is a Tutsi whose
father was killed. He said he did not know where his mother
and sisters were. Regarding his time spent at the refugee
camp, he said the following:
“You couldn’t talk to anybody. You even couldn’t
trust Burundians. Some of them did things that
were wrong. Some have a bad past. There are also
racists. If you tell them your story. . .. It’s not good.”
He had no contact with other Burundians in the place
where he lived. He lived with a Congolese Tutsi he had met
in the refugee camp:
“We speak the same language, we share the same
ethnicity, that’s why he is my friend. There is
another Burundian living in the neighborhood,
but he is a Hutu. And given what has happened
in the past, it is difficult for me to associate with
him.”
Others avoided Burundian politics and politicians
because they held them accountable for the conflicts that
had disrupted their country. Pierre (male, age 26, temporary
residence permit) said “I do not like politics. My father
was never involved in politics and yet they killed him
just like that.” Therefore, he separated himself from local
members of Burundian political parties: “You try to avoid
these people. I do not even want to know them.” In short:
there was a simultaneous orientation towards a shared
national origin as well as a (latent) experienced political and
ethnical contrast concerning the country of origin that made
some respondents decide not to make contact with fellow
countrymen.
On other hand, there were respondents who declared
they wanted to work towards reconciliation. However, they
did not want reconciliation based on a shared nationality, but
on a shared religious conviction. Among the respondents,
fifteen were religious: six Catholics, four Protestants, four
Catholics who converted to Protestantism in The Nether-
lands, and one Muslim. Half of the respondents attended
church services weekly. About a third of the religious
respondents chose a church in the neighborhood where they
were often the only Africans present. Another third of them
purposely avoided professing their faith in churches that were
popular among compatriots. The others deliberately chose to
visit churches where other Africans congregated, including
people from Burundi, Congo and Rwanda. Pierre (male, age
26, temporary residence permit) had started a prayer group
at the asylum center he lived in, consisting of 120 members.
He said the group tried to start a dialogue. Politics were
not discussed, but the necessity of living together peacefully
and the necessity of reconciliation was preached. Sometimes,
a priest from a country other than Burundi or Rwanda
was invited: According to Pierre, “With someone like that,
the message comes across better because he is not part of
the problem.” Hence, it was not a shared nationality, but
rather a shared religious faith that some respondents used
to overcome the ethnic divisions resulting from Burundi’s
turbulent history.
In sum, contact and identification with fellow coun-
trymen in The Netherlands was not self-evident given
the smoldering ethnical and political opposition among
Burundians. This heterogeneity among Burundians in The
Netherlands manifested itself in mutually exclusive networks
and in hybrid identities. However, these differences between
compatriots with different ethnic and political backgrounds
were sometimes overcome through a shared religious faith.
The heterogeneity that originated from the situation in
Burundi also determined respondents’ transnational involve-
ment with Burundi.
Therefore, on one hand it cannot be assumed that a
shared national origin is associated with feelings of solidarity
among Burundians. This conclusion counters Schuster’s [35]
argument that currently there is no reason for migrants
to forget about their home country or to ignore the past.
On the other hand, this does not mean that transnational
identification with fellow countrymen can be ruled out
a priori if political and ethnic conflicts have been the
most important motive for migration. After all, a common
religious belief was employed to at least temporarily bridge
differences resulting from conflict in the country of origin
[4, page 144].
These findings point first and foremost to the importance
of the distinction between migrants who are selective or not
in their contacts with compatriots [28, page 21], [8, 26].
Previous research has established that political divisions and
alliances can obstruct the solidarity between labor and family
migrants coming from the same country of origin. For
instance, conflicting identities in Bengali speaking families in
Singapore such as Indians versus Bangladeshi, Hindus versus
Muslims, secular individuals versus religious individuals, and
nationalists versus cosmopolitans hampered mutual contacts
within this seemingly uniform community [36]. However,
it is even more likely that differences, divisionary lines, and
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mistrust shape transnationalism in the case of refugees: “If
community can be questioned for ethnic minorities, it must
be examined even more carefully when considering refugees,
whose experiences in the conflict that they have sought
refugee from may mean that there is no political unity and
there may be strong differences within the group” [37, page
41]; see also [38, page 234]. Again, these insights endorse
the conclusion that the motive for migration is important in
relation to transnationalism.
Furthermore, we have shown that transnational involve-
ment also occurred among migrants who shared other
features than national origin [39, page 1189]. For exam-
ple, we saw that migrants from African countries other
than Burundi participated in evangelic communities in
which Burundian Christians also participated, and that
these religious communities were also transnationally active,
such as inviting a pastor from another African country to
participate. Other research has shown that Bosnian Muslim
organizations maintained intense links with general Muslim
organizations [6, page 624]. Another study demonstrated
that second generation Hindu-Surinamese living in The
Netherlands are more oriented towards India and Indian
people than towards Surinam, partly a result of the influence
of Bollywood culture [40]. This orientation can even result in
contact with Indians living elsewhere as well as visits to these
countries. There is a greater chance that transnationalism
will be relatively detached from the shared national origin
when there is evidence of ambivalence towards compatriots.
The likelihood of ambivalent feelings towards compatriots
is greater among refugees than among labor and family
migrants because of the conflicts that induced their flight.
This is the third indication that migration motives are
important in explaining transnationalism.
Finally, our findings show that transnationalism is a
dynamic process.
Transnationalism is not a “state of being,” [. . .] but rather
[. . .] a dynamic process [6, page 615]; see also [41, page 6],
[42, page 139].With the passage of time, the aversion towards
being in contact with Burundian compatriots who were seen
to be perpetrators of injustices in Burundi was sometimes
bridged through a shared religious faith. However, this
willingness to reconcile could disappear should conflict
break out again in Burundi. Al-Ali et al. [8] found a
comparable dynamic among Bosnian and Eritrean asylum
seekers. While transnationalism predominantly consisted of
political opposition against governors of their country of
origin during the conflict, transnationalism was displaced
to social, economic, and cultural activities after the conflicts
had ended and the prospect of repatriation had faded to the
background. In other words, the significance of migration
motives for explaining transnationalism can change.
8. Diaspora Is Not Homogeneous:
The Importance of the Country of Settlement
for Transnationalism
A third assumption about transnationalism pertains to the
diaspora. According to Sheffer [43], this term was originally
used to describe specifically the coerced dispersion of Jews,
Greeks, and Armenians across various destinations. But this
term has now obtained amuch broader definition. Currently,
the diaspora signifies a common origin, the maintenance of
regular contacts with the area of origin, and transnational
networks. Faist [44, page 16] argues that both transnational
migrant populations as well as the diaspora are wrongly
considered to be a homogeneous unit. This assumption
occurs mostly in The discourse on the use of “the” migrant
community to assist development in the country of origin,
a popular topic embraced by NGOs [42, 45–48] as well as
researchers [49, 50].
However, our respondents perceived transnationalism
to be different depending upon the country of settlement
(regarding the heterogeneity of the Burundian diaspora, see
also [34, page 1164/5]). Burundian migration populations in
Belgium and The Netherlands proved to be fundamentally
different. The migration of Burundians to The Netherlands
predominantly gained momentum as a result of the war
that occurred during the 1990s. However, students and
refugees had already been immigrating to Belgium since
independence in 1962. This migration flow undoubtedly
had to do with the fact that Belgium, under mandate of
the former League of Nations, governed Burundi in the
period between the First World War and independence in
1962. Consequently, Brussels is the center of the Burundian
diaspora in Europe. The neighborhood of Elsene—popularly
renamed Matonge´—is particularly popular among wealthy
Burundians and Rwandian and Congolese business owners
like caterers and hair dressers. Burundian organizations,
with links to The Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg, and
France, have settled here. Many Burundians in Brussels are
highly educated, occupy prestigious positions, and a few
Burundians who have two passports are evenmembers of the
Burundian government.
Half of the respondents occasionally visited compatriots
in Belgium for social, religious, or political ends, or in con-
nection with development aid. They often visited Brussels,
attending conferences or meetings with governors, or visiting
compatriots. They also maintained contacts with the country
of origin from within Belgium. Viviane (female, 50 years old,
naturalized) explained the following:
“The first trip after I had my permit was to Brus-
sels, to people I knew from Burundi. That was a
great event. My husband and I often go there now.
There is an ambiance similar to that in Africa,
very different from here. Then we feel as if we are
back in Burundi.”
Given the importance of Belgium to Burundians, this
country also posed a greater threat to some of the respon-
dents. In Belgium, the diaspora was divided. The Hutu and
the Tutsi did not mix at all and apart from the ethnic cleavage
there were cleavages among the Hutu based primarily on
time of arrival: the uncompromising first arrivals and the
more open minded newcomers. The various diaspora groups
reinforced the antagonisms through mutual positioning as
political others [51, page 752/3]. For example, Isabelle
(female, 36 years old, temporary residence permit) became
very agitated when asked the question whether she ever visits
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the African neighborhood in Brussels: “It wasn’t Brussels
that brought us here. It’s the Dutch who saved us!” She was
not the only one to maintain distance from the Burundian
community in Belgium. Claudine (female, 28 years old,
temporary residence permit) also said she was content to
have been allotted a home in a remote place in the north of
The Netherlands:
“I prefer to live here. If you are from a country
like that, you have experienced so much. I think
that you have so much more tranquility over here.
You should not have such a busy life right away. It
should go slowly. You need to let it develop in your
head.”
In sum, transnationalism took a different form in The
Netherlands than in Belgium because of the composition of
the Burundian migrant population in both countries. The
politically active Hutus who fled from Burundi before the
1990s predominantly went to Belgium. They had formed a
close-knit, albeit divided community in Belgium, complete
with established political, religious, and cultural institutions.
Hence, Belgium fulfilled a more central role in the diaspora
than The Netherlands. This central position posed a threat
to the respondents who wanted to keep their distance from
their compatriots. Significant differences between settlement
countries have also been found for Moroccan migrants,
for example. Many highly-educated Moroccan migrants
migrated during and after the colonial period to France,
while predominantly lower-educated Moroccan Berbers
immigrated at a later time as guest laborers to countries
like The Netherlands. Therefore, migrant populations differ
between settlement countries because settlement countries
take up different positions in relation to the country of origin
[52]. The use of the term diaspora contains the risk of detach-
ing a migrant population from the national context in rela-
tion to different settlement countries, as if the relationship
between settlement countries and countries of origin does
not matter [28], [29, page 789], [38, page 232], [45].
9. Conclusion
Our findings suggest that the rather “optimistic” assump-
tions underlying the “transnational turn” [53, 54] in migra-
tion studies do not apply to the population of Burun-
dian asylum seekers in The Netherlands, which deviates
from other populations initially studied with respect to
magnitude, duration of stay, and motive for migration.
Transnationalism is not self-evident for the victims of the
conflicts in Burundi nor is it self-evident for economically
deprived Burundians who lack the opportunities to maintain
such contacts. Although Burundians live together peacefully
in The Netherlands, contact and identification with compa-
triots either in the country of settlement or elsewhere are not
self-evident due to smoldering ethnic and political divisions
among Burundians. Furthermore, Burundian transnation-
alism plays out differently in the Netherlands than in
Belgium. The latter plays a more central role in Burundian
transnationalism than The Netherlands given its position
as former colonizer. Belgium is therefore more attractive to
Burundians who want to be transnationally active and less
attractive to Burundians who want to refrain from it. In
sum, transnationalism is not self-evident for Burundians;
divisions and conflicts in the country of origin continue
to influence migrant populations rendering it a heteroge-
neous population, and transnationalism is shaped differently
in the settlement countries of The Netherlands and Belgium.
Our study has been small-scale and exploratory in nature
and has only studied transnationalism “from below” [28].
Moreover, it has been limited to the settlement country of
The Netherlands and, hence, has not adopted a transnational
methodology. In this respect, it is less advanced than “multi-
sited” ethnographic studies that complement the one-sided
studies of immigrants in receiving countries with research
into the role of those who stay behind in the countries of ori-
gin [55, 56] and of longitudinal studies where transmigrants
are followed for a longer period (as advocated by [41, page
9]).
Nonetheless, our study has shown thatmigrationmotives
play an important role in transnationalism. Although our
research supports Al-Ali et al. [8] finding that asylum seekers
are not only transnationally active in a political sense but also
in other ways, this does not imply that they are comparable
with labor and family migrants in all respects. For asylum
seekers, transnationalism is less self-evident, more charged,
and more likely to deal with people of the same ethnic
or religious background instead of the same country of
origin. Neglecting migration motives implies that important
differences in the type and intensity of transnationalism are
being ignored.
Our conclusion is congruent with the way transnation-
alism has developed as a research field. The first theories
on transnationalism were primarily based on established
communities of labor and family migrants [1]. Allegedly,
this led to the belief we were entering “a post-national
era” [51, page 745], suggesting transnationalism was “every-
where.” Subsequently, it has become increasingly clear that
transnationalism plays out differently for specific categories
of migrants in different contexts and does not contain itself
to “home” and “settlement” countries. For example, while
the role of nostalgia in creating an imagined homeland and a
clear distinction between “home” and “away” are particularly
important for adults, future imaginations of “homelands”,
and the blurring of the distinction between places that “send”
and “receive” are more important to children [57]. Further-
more, transnationalism has also been shown to be a highly
gendered phenomenon. For instance, apart from the fact
that men are overrepresented in public and institutionalized
transnational ties while women dominate the caring and kin
work in transnational families, men also have a stronger
orientation toward the community of origin because they
often lose social status in the process of migration, whereas
the inverse is true for women [29, 58]. At the same time,
the impact of factors like migration motive, life course, and
gender have proven to be highly context-dependent. This
means our study has contributed to more recent research
showing transnationalism is more multifaceted and complex
than assumed at the beginning of the “transnational turn” in
migration studies.
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